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Abstract: In “Authoritarianism and Ideology,” Asad Haider approaches the problem of authoritarianism
by considering the classical question of tyranny, as framed by Spinoza, and how this can be traced to
the Marxist theory of ideology. A fundamental axis of the debate over ideology in twentieth century
Marxism was the phenomenon of fascism, theorized in highly influential but also markedly different ways
by figures like Wilhelm Reich and Theodor Adorno. A close reading of two major texts—Reich's Mass
Psychology of Fascism and Adorno's contributions to The Authoritarian Personality—provides a basis for
conceptually elaborating different directions that can be taken in the study of authoritarianism within
the framework of ideology critique. The essay concludes by examining a specific form of ideology which
is gestured to by both Reich and Adorno, though not systematically explored: racial ideology. As a
fundamental component of contemporary authoritarianism, the phenomenon of racism allows us to
elaborate the theory of ideology and its political implications.
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Asad HAIDER
Authoritarianism and Ideology
In his classic investigation of authoritarianism, The Mass Psychology of Fascism, Wilhelm Reich proposed
an inversion of common-sense political reasoning: “what has to be explained is not the fact that the
man who is hungry steals or the fact that the man who is exploited strikes, but why the majority of
those who are hungry don't steal and why the majority of those who are exploited don't strike” (19).
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari famously traced Reich's formulation to the foundational question of
Spinoza's Theological-Political Treatise: why do people fight for their servitude as if it were their
salvation? Spinoza refused to answer his question at the level of consciousness. Instead, he proposed
that the “sad passions” which accompany servitude should be understood in terms of the material forces
which diminish our power to act. It is only by entering into composition with other bodies, by adding
our powers to theirs, that we can know the joy of acting. When the corporeal constraints imposed by
tyranny make us unable to act, we are susceptible to superstition, and so our impotence appears in our
imaginations as the result of our own will.
Intuitively, we know this is the case. While we might initially believe that people are not constantly
on strike because they are foolish, complacent, or complicit, we also know that their lives are determined
by the physical force of the police, the inescapable compulsion to earn a paycheck, and the everyday
habits which lead us now to sit quietly in our chairs.
But when the authors of Anti-Oedipus equate the theory of ideology with mystification or illusion,
and argue that Reich fails to follow through on the implications of his analysis when he maintains the
contrast of rational material interests to irrational desires, they misconstrue the concept of ideology
(104, 257, 344–5). In fact, it is essential to maintain the theory of ideology; without this the analysis
of desire will lead, as it does in both The Mass Psychology of Fascism and Anti-Oedipus, to a biological
vitalism. I will return to the perspective of Spinoza with which I began.
If ideology cannot be explained by mystification, rational material interests are not an inert baseline
but are always constituted by social powers and are themselves also apprehended in imaginary
representations. Material interests are in fact constituted in the rationality of revolt. From the
perspective I am proposing, superstition is better understood as something like what Marx will later
describe as ideology, though not in the sense of false beliefs. It is rather a theory of ideology continuous
with Spinoza’s appendix to Book 1 of the Ethics, which says: “men believe that they are free, precisely
because they are conscious of their volitions and desires; yet concerning the causes that have
determined them to desire and will they do not think, not even dream about, because they are ignorant
of them” (239). Ideology, on this reading, is the field in which the material institutions and practices of
the state are represented in an imaginary form. It takes hold in our imaginations because our bodies
are limited and cannot form knowledge of nature without the practice of reason. Tyranny, which has an
interest in keeping us ignorant, is the material relation which is represented in the imagination as
superstition. Ignorance cannot explain the existence of tyranny and servitude; it is the effect which itself
has to be explained.
Along these lines, what Deleuze and Guattari found so profound in Reich’s analysis was his refusal
“to accept ignorance or illusion on the part of the masses as an explanation of fascism.” The masses
were “not innocent dupes,” but rather, “under a certain set of conditions, they wanted fascism, and it is
this perversion of the desire of the masses that needs to be accounted for” (29). To explain the
susceptibility of the masses to fascism in terms of fascist mystifications, Reich argued, would quite
simply be to invert the real question. Fascism had mystification as its very function. Its mystifications
could not be used to explain its mass success; it was rather precisely the fact that its mystifications
were successful which had to be explained (21). We cannot proceed in our analysis by explaining the
desire of the masses as the result of their choice, but only in terms of a material analysis of the powers
of acting, which is also the rationality of revolt. When these powers are decomposed and disorganized,
the irrationality of obedience is represented in the imagination as an act of will.
On the basis of this analysis, I will turn now to the theory of ideology in The Authoritarian Personality,
which relates it quite specifically not only to authoritarianism but also to prejudice. In a formulation
which at first glance seems curiously similar to that of Reich, Adorno writes in his “Remarks on The
Authoritarian Personality”: “Today, each and every man is faced with a tremendous bulk of objectively
existing prejudices, discriminations and articulate anti-Semitic attitudes. The accumulated power of this
objective complex is so great and apparently so far beyond individual powers of resistance that one
might indeed ask, why are people not anti-Semitic, instead of asking why certain kinds of people are
anti-Semitic” (lxii).
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Of course, despite the seemingly similar logic of inversion, Adorno’s line of reasoning is something
like the opposite of Reich’s: instead of beginning with the rationality of revolt, he begins with the
irrationality of the existing society. The task he sets for himself is to explain the extent to which antiSemitism expresses the character of the historical period and its forms of social life. Rather than the
division represented by revolt, Adorno begins from the social totality. He writes that “this totality
manifests itself in numerous aspects, all of which are comprised in it and appear as particular ‘causes’
only to the kind of thinking which, naively following the pattern of natural sciences, forgets that all social
facts bear the imprint of the system in which they appear and which can never be explained satisfactorily
by atomistic enumeration of various causes” (l). “The principle of social totality,” he affirms, “accounts
for prejudice” (li).
Now, the key insight of The Authoritarian Personality, which converges with that of Reich, is that it
is not enough to show that fascist propaganda fools people, but rather to ask why people are fooled.
For fascism “to be successful as a political movement,” it “must have a mass basis”: “It must secure not
only the frightened submission but the active cooperation of the great majority of the people.” But since
fascism “favors the few at the expense of the many, it cannot possibly demonstrate that it will so
improve the situation of most people that their real interests will be served. It must therefore make its
major appeal, not to rational self-interest, but to emotional needs—often to the most primitive and
irrational wishes and fears. If it be argued that fascist propaganda fools people into believing that their
lot will be improved, then the question arises: Why are they so easily fooled?” (10).
In the introduction to The Authoritarian Personality, we see a broader methodological ambiguity in
the deployment of the concept of ideology. The authors argue that it is insufficient to study fascist
propaganda, and that it is necessary to go beyond this to understand “not only the psychological
structure of the individual but the total objective situation in which he lives.” The guiding assumption is
that “people in general tend to accept political and social programs which they believe will serve their
economic interests.” At the same time, “economic motives in the individual may not have the dominant
and crucial role that is often ascribed to them.” Indeed, if “economic self-interest were the only
determinant of opinion,” this would logically entail that “people of the same socioeconomic status” would
“have very similar opinions,” an assumption not borne out by the research. Thus, the authors conclude:
“To explain why it is that people of the same socioeconomic status so frequently have different
ideologies, while people of a different status often have very similar ideologies, we must take account
of other than purely economic needs.” And indeed, researchers must account for the fact that “people
very frequently do not behave in such a way as to further their material interests, even when it is clear
to them what these interests are,” and in certain instances appear even to go against these interests
(8).
The authors answer this question with reference to the personality structure. But what theory of
ideology does this entail? The Authoritarian Personality is not entirely clear on this question. There are
a few different indications of how this notion is used, but throughout the text ideology is defined in
terms of “opinions, attitudes, and values” (2). In his preface Horkheimer presents a theory of ideology
in terms of illusion and debunking, grounded in Descartes rather than Spinoza. He writes that “the
superstitious belief in witchcraft was overcome in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries” with the
influence of modern science and Cartesian rationalism. Once the “immediate effect of spiritual factors
on the realm of the corporal” was exposed as an illusion, “the foundations of the belief in magic were
destroyed” (lxii). Along these lines, in the case of fascism, The Authoritarian Personality concludes that
“fascism is imposed on the people, that it actually goes against their basic interests, and that when they
can be made fully aware of themselves and their situation they are capable of behaving realistically”
(976). Of course, this is in apparent tension with the view which is also put forth in the conclusion, that
“the modification of the potentially fascist structure cannot be achieved by psychological means alone,”
since it is the product of “the total organization of society” and can be “changed only as that society is
to be changed” (975).
The role of opinion turns out to be ambiguous, and this extends to the whole theory of ideology. In
Adorno’s “Remarks,” referring to views on “economic problems,” he says that the “study remains on the
level of ideology. We register, and to a certain extent interpret, our subjects’ overt opinions on specific
economic matters” (xlii-xliii). On the other hand, regarding the question of prejudice, he notes that
opinions are not sufficient. Most subjects would be unlikely to characterize themselves as anti-Semites,
or to indicate an interest in joining a fascist movement. Furthermore, he points out, “prejudice may be
pre-conscious or even unconscious.” In these formulations, ideology as consciously held opinion is
contrasted to the unconscious determination of prejudice (xlv).
In an analysis broadly structured by the distinction between conscious opinion and unconscious
prejudice, Adorno contrasts individuals as “autonomous units whose decisions are important for their
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own fate as well as that of society” to the “submissive centers of reactions” which are their high-scoring
subjects (xlii). What underlies the analysis of the authoritarian personality type is an analysis of the
expression of the historical transformation of the social totality, in which the classical individual has
been undermined by the extension of the commodity form and mass consumer culture.
As Peter E. Gordon puts it, this problem is implied by the very methodology of the study:
Here a certain irony comes into view, even if it remains only partially recognized and thematically
underdeveloped. In Adorno’s suggestion—that a given person may be “standardized” and “think” in a
standardized way or may instead “oppose” standardization—we may detect a self-reflexivity problem. The
distinction risks measuring the high-scoring subject on the F scale against a triumphalist image of the true
individual who is apparently immune to typological thinking. Only the “high-scoring” individual is prone to
stereotypical thinking. The distinction itself, in other words, looks at social reality from the perspective of the
high-scoring subject rather than the true individual. This opens up the possibility of a vicious circle or selfreferential paradox where the principle that animates the study becomes trapped in its own diagnostic. If
stereotypical thinking involves the reduction of differentiated persons to quasi-natural kinds, one cannot help
but wonder if the social-psychological method of the study itself has not deployed the very technique it marks
as a pathology. (56)

The only way, Gordon argues, to “rescue the research study from this self-referential problem” is “to
recognize that (from Adorno’s perspective) the very category of a ‘true individual’ was beginning to
vanish from social reality” (56). Thus, as Gordon puts it:
Such a research agenda corresponded to emergent patterns in contemporary social reality. Modern patterns
of economic exchange and commoditized cultural experience meant that genuine individuals were gradually
being reduced to social types, and this developing feature of society itself served as a realist justification for
a research agenda that methodologically compressed individuals into recognizable social types. Lurking in this
argument, however, was a far more radical claim that identified stereotypical thinking and authoritarianism
with general features of the modern social order itself. (57)

In Adorno’s words, “the all-pervading trait of social ‘alienation’ largely reflects the nature of a
commodity economy in which man appears as producer and consumer of goods and not as the subject
of his society” (li). We can distinguish this theory of the historical dialectic, in which the autonomous
subject is displaced by the submissive center of reaction, from the classical theory of ideology of Spinoza,
which proposes that this submissiveness may precisely be autonomously chosen by a subject which is
formed in subjection to a particular power. From this vantage point, it would not be possible to say that
the classical individual has been historically undermined by the social reality. The subjection of
individuals is not the result of a historical dialectic. Rather, the individual is itself an effect of impersonal
causes. The individual psyche, or the bourgeois self, far from dissolving in the period of mass
commodification, remains the form taken by subjection.
Let’s now also compare this account to Reich’s theory of ideology. Reich much more firmly and
consistently rejects the notion that the debunking of mysticism could succeed as a measure against
fascism (21). He argues, in contrast to Horkheimer, that the exposure of superstition by scientific
enlightenment did not succeed in eliminating religious morality, which was the effect of the social basis
of the authoritarian family and sexual repression, and thus could not be eliminated without transforming
this basis (121, 171).
From the vantage point of rational analysis, Reich writes, workers should develop a consciousness of
their economic situation, and from there develop a program to overcome their exploitation. But this is
not what happens historically. There is instead a “cleavage between the social situation of the working
masses and their consciousness of this situation,” which means that in fact the working masses end up
worsening their social position rather than improving it (10). This cleavage is the site of the irrational
thought and action which manifests itself in the most extreme case of fascism. As Étienne Balibar writes
of Reich:
What he dares affirm is that historical materialism (the only “real” one at a given moment) denies out of
principle the reality, the “material force” of ideology as an “emotional” or affective structure of the masses,
distinct from the “consciousness” they have of their conditions of existence, and as a consequence denies the
irreducible split between class condition and mass movements (179).

This can be distinguished from the division of the social totality described by Adorno, which is the
contradiction between the total and the individual that is the expression of social alienation (lv–lvi). It
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is rather, Reich writes, “a question of the role of ideology and the emotional attitude of these masses
seen as a historical factor, a question of the repercussion of the ideology on the economic basis” (10).
The question becomes: “what prevents the economic situation from coinciding with the psychic structure
of the masses?” (14). Rather than the contradiction between the total and the individual, it is a question
of the disjunction of ideology and the economic basis, characterized by the logic of repercussion. Thus,
Reich concludes:
The sexual morality that inhibits the will to freedom, as well as those forces that comply with authoritarian
interests, derive their energy from repressed sexuality. Now we have a better comprehension of an essential
part of the process of the “repercussion of ideology on the economic basis”: sexual inhibition changes the
structure of economically suppressed man in such a way that he acts, feels, and thinks contrary to his own
material interests. (32)

Now, to understand Reich’s theory of ideology we have to pay attention to his insistence on
distinguishing the irrational from mystification (17-8). What is the basis of ideology if not a mistaken
apprehension of reality? As is well known, the role of psychoanalysis in Reich’s theory is to explain the
basis of ideology in terms of sexual repression. But what is significant for Reich is not simply “the effects
and mechanisms of sexual suppression and repression and of their pathological consequences in the
individual,” but the social basis of this repression, which leads Reich to take a distance from Freud’s
“philosophy of civilization” (28). Sexual repression, according to Reich, cannot be understood in terms
of the transhistorical imperatives of civilization. Of this theory he writes: “One becomes a bit skeptical
and asks how it is possible for the masturbation of small children and the sexual intercourse of
adolescents to disrupt the building of gas stations and the manufacturing of airplanes” (29).
In elaborating a social theory of sexual repression, however, Reich also takes a position quite distinct
from the one which would explain it in terms of the alienation and reification of the commodity form.
The character structure does not emanate from the center of the social totality but is rather the result
of indifferent processes, specifically the historical emergence of the authoritarian patriarchy and the
subsequent introduction of class divisions. Sexual repression and its accompanying morality are part of
the reproduction of the institution of private property which is organized by marriage. Ideology is then
a contingent result of a historical sequence of causes and effects. The repercussion of ideology on the
economic basis is not merely the intersection of two distinct systems, but rather implies a mutually
constitutive relation. Ideology does not simply reflect the economic process, but embeds it in the psychic
structure, and itself becomes a material force. Reich writes:
The ideology of every social formation has the function not only of reflecting the economic process of this
society, but also and more significantly of embedding this economic process in the psychic structures of the
people who make up the society… inasmuch as a social ideology changes man's psychic structure, it has not
only reproduced itself in man but, what is more significant, has become an active force, a material power in
man, who in turn has become concretely changed, and, as a consequence thereof, acts in a different and
contradictory fashion. (18)

The materiality of ideology is also embedded in a complex historical temporality. Reich posits that
ideology “changes at a slower pace than the economic basis,” with an extraordinary reasoning. Since
the character structure is formed in early childhood, he says, it develops at a much slower rate than the
rapidly changing forces of technical production. He says:
The basic traits of the character structures corresponding to a definite historical situation are formed in early
childhood, and are far more conservative than the forces of technical production. It results from this that, as
time goes on, the psychic structures lag behind the rapid changes of the social conditions from which they
derived, and later come into conflict with new forms of life. (18)

In other words, a few discordant timelines are established: the longer development from the
contradictions of matriarchal society which yield the authoritarian patriarchy and thus the economic
structure; the persistence of sexual repression alongside the development of the economic structure;
the rapid change of the technical forces of production alongside the formation of the character structure.
There is thus no unitary line between economic structure and ideology. This is once again quite distinct
from the view that the personality structure is the manifestation of the social totality. The forms of
subjectivity are not the expression of the commodity form, but rather belong to relatively autonomous
sequences of cause and effect constituted by cleavage, repercussion, and lag.
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As a case study, I will now finally turn to the form of racial ideology. As Robyn Marasco writes:
One of the most provocative arguments put forth in The Authoritarian Personality is that the affective and
ideological energy for fascism comes mainly from racism. Other elements surely matter—class alliances,
political opportunities, the state of the state—but fascism takes root in the soil of racism. Would it be
appropriate to call Trump the F-word? Historians remind us of the profound differences between Mussolini’s
dictatorship in Italy, Hitler’s Germany, and Shōwa Japan, each of these “fascisms” distinct from the other. But
the diversity of national political movements does not cancel the underlying momentum that drives and unites
them: an ideology of race, attached to an idea of the nation and national greatness, that authorizes every
inhumanity. Neofascist movements, surging in the United States and around the world, may differ from their
twentieth- century predecessors in any number of ways, but the ideology of race remains. It has new targets
and new means of organization and new forms of expression, but murderous racism defines this new fascism
as much as the old. (716)

However, racial ideology is to be distinguished from what The Authoritarian Personality calls
“ethnocentric ideology.” The well-known subject of the study, Larry, who scores low in ethnocentric
ideology, says that “The discrimination toward Negroes is because they aren't understood and because
they are physically different. Towards Jews it’s because of their business ability – the fear that they'll
take over business control of the country” (39). Another subject, referred to as F109, says: “I have an
age-old feeling against Jews, some against Negroes. Jews stick together, are out for money… Jews are
in big businesses. It seems they will be running the country before long. I know some people of Jewish
descent who are very nice, but they're not full-blooded Jews. Jews have large noses, are slight in stature,
little sly Jews. The women have dark hair, dark eyes, are sort of loud.” The notes on F109’s interview
add: “Subject knows she's prejudiced; she thinks she needs educating too, by working with people of
different races” (625). We might say in today’s terms that F109 seeks to check her privilege. Whatever
the consciously held opinions of Larry, who is low in ethnocentric ideology, and F109, whose bad
conscience reveals a typical psychic structure, we can clearly observe that both remain caught up in the
structure of racial ideology.
Let me proceed by distinguishing ethnocentrism and ethnocentric ideology from what I am calling
racial ideology. The significance of these distinctions becomes clear when The Authoritarian Personality
is situated in its American context. There is a constant comparison in the study between anti-Semitism
and racial prejudice against black people, which is inseparable in the responses of the subjects yet
distinguished analytically. Ethnocentrism is defined in the study by R. Nevitt Sanford as “the tendency
to express opinions and attitudes that are hostile toward a variety of ethnic groups and uncritically
favorable to the group with which the individual is identified” (45). Daniel J. Levinson characterizes it as
“an ideological system pertaining to groups and group relations,” suggesting a certain redundancy to
the term “ethnocentric ideology” (104). Levinson insists that this term is preferable to prejudice, and
that it has the advantage of shifting the emphasis away from “race,” which he rightly points out is not
scientifically or anthropologically valid (103). In a discussion of the E scale, the study says “Since
Negroes are a large and severely oppressed group and since imagery of ‘the Negro’ has become so
elaborated in American cultural mythology, they merited a subscale of their own” (106). Adorno writes
that “Our study grew out of specific investigations into anti-Semitism. As our work advanced, however,
the emphasis gradually shifted. We came to regard it as our main task not to analyze anti-Semitism or
any other antiminority prejudice as a sociopsychological phenomenon per se, but rather to examine the
relation of antiminority prejudice to broader ideological and characterological patterns” (605).
However, we are confronted with the question of the sociological validity of race, which is inescapable
in the analysis of American society, and thus the substantive distinction of racial prejudice from
ethnocentrism. This was the topic of a study published two years before The Authoritarian Personality,
Oliver Cromwell Cox’s Caste, Class, and Race. In the destructive moment of his analysis Cox proposes
that studying “race relations” entails eliminating the notions of ethnocentrism, intolerance, and even
“racism.” His definition of race is quite simple: “race may be thought of as simply any group of people
that is generally believed to be, and generally accepted as, a race in any given area of ethnic
competition” (319). Ethnocentrism, since it need not take a specifically racial form, cannot explain the
reality of race relations, and intolerance can be directed against any group which does not conform to
social convention (321). Racial prejudice, Cox argues, is “prejudice marked by visibility, physical
distinguishability,” but “it is not, however, caused by physical differences” (350). Here the argument of
Larry that prejudice against black people is to be explained by their physical difference must be inverted.
To repeat a consistent methodological maneuver, it is rather the fact that prejudice is attached to visible
physical differences which has to be explained.
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The reason that Cox argues against racism as an explanation returns us to the problem of ideology.
First of all, Cox takes a distance from ideology, which he equates with a “system of rationalization”
(321). The important achievement of this method is that it does not isolate the abstraction of race and
project it throughout history. In the absence of this historical specificity we would only have the
transhistorical and ultimately theological notion of prejudice, which cannot explain what Cox
characterizes as race relations and leads to absurd possibilities. He writes: “It would be, for instance, a
ridiculous inversion of thought to expect the native peoples of America to have had race prejudice for
the white invaders” (350).
This means that Cox highlights the contingency of race: “It should be made clear that we do not
mean to say that the white race is the only one capable of race prejudice. It is probable that without
capitalism, a cultural chance occurrence among whites, the world might never have experienced race
prejudice” (345). He adds that any other so-called race could not now aspire “either to duplicate the
racial record of Europeans or to dominate them.” The advancement of technology would not permit the
“cultural distance” (348) that whites cultivated in order to achieve their commercial and industrial
development in isolation and therefore become capable of “economic and military world dominance”
(331). “Therefore,” he says, “we must conclude that race prejudice is not only a cultural trait developed
among Europeans, but also that no other race could reasonably hope to duplicate the phenomenon. Like
the discovery of the world, it seems evident that this racial achievement could occur only once” (3489).
Cox says, “Studies on the origin of racism involve the study of the development of an ideology, an
approach which usually results in the substitution of the history of a system of rationalization for that of
a material social fact” (321). The material social fact, for Cox, is capitalism, which is the basis for the
specificity of modern European “race relations,” which he also appears to suggest are a material social
fact, and are not to be conflated with previous forms of social antagonism. Race in Cox’s analysis divides
between ideology and material social fact. By making this distinction Cox is able to explain material
phenomena without resorting to making ideology into a cause. That is, people are not oppressed because
of their race, but are rather assigned a race as a consequence of constitutive power relations. He writes:
“The capitalist exploitation of the colored workers, it should be observed, consigns them to employments
and treatment that is humanly degrading. In order to justify this treatment the exploiters must argue
that the workers are innately degraded and degenerate, consequently they naturally merit their
condition” (334).
However, this account leaves open three problems regarding the theory of ideology. First of all, it is
difficult to distinguish ideology from the material social fact, because if race relations are constituted by
the power relationship established by capitalist exploitation, how does this power relationship take a
specifically racial form without the ideology of racism? Cox writes: “This, then, is the beginning of
modern race relations. It was not an abstract, natural, immemorial feeling of mutual antipathy between
groups, but rather a practical exploitative relationship with its socio-attitudinal facilitation – at that time
only nascent race prejudice” (332). The fact that this is a socio-attitudinal facilitation which develops
nascent race prejudice suggests that ideology plays an overdetermining role.
The fact that this is socio-attitudinal facilitation leads to the second problem, which is that by
explaining ideology as a system of rationalization, Cox adopts a functionalist theory of ideology.
Functionalism demonstrates on the one hand the reproduction of particular phenomena in terms of the
reproduction of the system or structure; therefore, it shows how these phenomena are not merely
accidental or contingent. Nevertheless, there is a complex relation between structure or necessity and
accident or contingency, which is exposed by the relation to historical specificity. If there is a historical
process characterized by specificity, there is no necessity or goal to the historical process. Cox is clear
that race relations are the result of a “chance occurrence.” We can describe the reproduction of a given
structure or system in terms of the becoming-necessary of contingency. It is not the evolution of a preexisting structure but precisely the fact of historical accidents which do not simply dissipate but take
hold in a structure which is reproduced and constitutes its elements. The repetition of these relations
over time constitutes a structure. For example, in the encounter of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie,
each class is constituted as an element of a class relation. In Cox’s object of race relations, racial groups
are constituted by the social antagonism resulting from the exploitation of slave labor. However, the
functionalist theory of ideology suggests that the ideology serves the purpose of realizing the goal of
reproducing social relations.
The third problem is the question of the subject of ideology, which underlies the language of
“facilitation” and “rationalization.” What is the agent that facilitates and rationalizes the existing system
of exploitation? Is it a conspiracy from above, carried out with propaganda? It is difficult to establish
the conscious action of the capitalist class in a conspiracy. This is first of all because capitalists are in
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competition and do not constitute a collective interest. But it is further because the perspective of the
structure implies that relations are not constituted by conscious action, but that this conscious action is
itself the effect of the structure. The capitalist is, in other words, the bearer of the capital relation. The
theory of ideology as facilitation and rationalization, on the other hand, reduces structure to subject.
Among the most significant developments of these insights and problems is the argument of Barbara
Fields in her article “Slavery, Race and Ideology in the United States of America.” In her analysis,
however, ideology is itself precisely a material social fact. It cannot be understood as a delusion, or
even a system of rationalization, but is rather “the descriptive vocabulary of day-to-day existence,
through which people make rough sense of the social reality that they live and create from day to day”
(110). To return to our earlier vocabulary, race is an imaginary relation in the sense that it is a way of
making sense of the effects of the structure, in the absence of a direct experience of the causes of these
effects. In the formation of race in American history, we are dealing with the following relations: first,
the differentiation of forced migrant labor according to the origin of migration, susceptibility to coercion,
and visible physical characteristics; second, the division between supposedly “free” contractual labor
and the ownership of people as property within a political system revolving around citizenship rights.
These effects and contradictions are represented in imaginary terms in the form of race.
With Fields we are presented with many of the same methodological insights, but a different theory
of ideology, of “racial ideology,” which directly situates race as such as an ideological form. She criticizes
the conflation of ideology and propaganda, but perhaps more salient for this discussion, she points out
that we cannot teleologically understand race as an explanation for historical phenomena in the 17th
century: “Historians can actually observe colonial Americans in the act of preparing the ground for race
without foreknowledge of what would later rise on the foundation they were laying.” What we see is
“society in the act of inventing race” (107). However, this is not an explanation according to conscious
action, suggesting that the ruling elites decided to create the category of race. Nor is it a functionalist
explanation, suggesting that even if race did not exist, it would be necessary to invent it. Rather, a
series of contingent determinations, from the fluctuations of tobacco prices to Bacon’s Rebellion,
produced a situation in which race arose as a way of making sense of real relations. This definition of
ideology suggests a different mode of subjectivity. Here the subject is not the agent of the structure but
a relation to the structure.
I will conclude by invoking Cox’s version of the basic point about the lack of utility of debunking
ideology. He writes: “We cannot defeat race prejudice by proving that it is wrong. The reason for this is
that race prejudice is only a symptom of a materialistic social fact… Our proof accomplishes nothing.
The articulate white man's ideas about his racial superiority are rooted deeply in the social system, and
it can be corrected only by changing the system itself” (462). From this vantage point, the attempts to
use race to explain the rise contemporary authoritarianism fall significantly short. They frequently
reproduce racial ideology, accepting, for example, that people are white because they believe they are,
and that this can explain their political action. Instead, we have to think in terms of a whiteness effect,
caused both by the structural history of race relations and the contemporary conjuncture marked by the
crisis of the political system. Understanding these causes will not debunk illusions and halt the rise of
contemporary authoritarianism, but it may allow us to begin to conceive of the possibility of producing
different effects.
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